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Debates and Classification Struggles
Regarding the Representation of
Migrants Workers
Éric Florence
1 For just over a year there has been a wide debate in the Chinese media over the dearth
of labourers from the countryside, in the Pearl River Delta in the first instance but
followed  by  other  coastal  regions.  Although  caution  is  called  for  in  assessing  the
breadth and the causes of this situation, it is worth noting that the most frequently
cited cause is the violation of workers’ rights and the disastrous working conditions in
the  manufacturing  sector  (2).  It  would  seem  that  a  large  number  of workers  are
refusing to go to places where working conditions are too bad and the non-payment of
wages  too  frequent.  In  order  to  have  a  better  understanding  of  current  debates
concerning the “penury” of labourers from the countryside, it is helpful to consider the
representations related to the “wave of mingong” (3) ( , mingongchao) in the late 1980s
and the early 1990s. It was during this period, marked by a socio-economic and political
crisis, that the question of migrant labour began to make its way to the forefront of
public debate. Previous works on the media representation of migrant workers have
pointed to the largely homogenising descriptions of rural masses penetrating cities to
threaten law and order, and social stability in general (4). While the press in the late
1980s and early 1990s conjured up a sudden and overwhelming rise in the number of
migrants, statistical data for that time actually show a very moderate increase (5). At
the same time,  even certain representations  that  actually  supported migrants  have
been described as contributing to the image of the migrant as an “inferior other” in
contrast with the legitimate city dweller.
2 In this article, basing my argument on a close study of daily and weekly press articles,
scientific journals, and reportage literature published between 1986 and 1991, I intend
to show that, rather than a simple homogenising description of labour migration in
terms of social disorder and urban disturbances, there is in fact a struggle taking place
around the way such migratory movements are represented, and that this is centred
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around the contentious relationship between the state and the market economy. This
struggle mainly finds expression through a debate over the terms that should be used
to  describe  migrants,  and  in  particular  over  the  expression  “blind  migrant”  (  ,
mangliu).  At issue is  the very legitimacy of their presence in cities,  and it  involves
redefining the outlines of the social and geographical hierarchy. In this article I will
also  reflect  upon  the  way  in  which  certain  discursive  categories,  such  as  “blind
migrant”, have developed historically, to show how they contribute towards defining
areas of state intervention (7).
3 After  considering  the  extent  of  the  continuity  between  the  way  migration  was
identified as a problem in the 1950s and again in the late 1980s, I  will  describe the
characteristics of this whole discourse which links spontaneous migration with urban
disturbance. I will then be able to attend to the logic informing the arguments of those
writers who present a positive image of labour migration, essentially by associating it
with the economic reforms and the market economy.
The context of the debate: social and political crisis 
4 The  situation  in  the  late  1980s  was  one  of  social  crisis  coupled  with  political  and
ideological tensions at the highest levels of government (8). Since the beginning of the
decade,  reformists  and  conservatives  had  been  clashing  over  the  extent  of  the
economic  reforms,  and  more  particularly  over  the  role  of  the  market  within  an
economic system that was still largely planned (9). As major steps were taken towards
deepening the reforms, the ideological tensions between reformists and conservatives
increased correspondingly. The former were mostly young economists grouped around
Zhao Ziyang, and opposed to them were the Chen Yun faction. From 1985 onwards, the
clashes grew fiercer around the issues of growth rates, inflation, price reforms, and the
fight against corruption (10). In 1987, the struggle between the Secretary of the Chinese
Communist Party, Zhao Ziyang, and the Prime Minister, Li Peng, escalated. In May 1987,
in  a  situation  of  inflation  and  social  dissatisfaction,  measures  were  adopted  to
accelerate the price reforms, but in September of the same year state control over the
economy  was  reinforced.  Towards  the  end  of  1988,  conservative  influence  over
economic policy reached its  highest  point,  and in March 1989 economic policy was
reoriented  towards  giving  priority  to  the  development  of  agriculture  and  basic
industries, at the expense of the rural and manufacturing enterprises. In addition, state
control over local affairs was strengthened. In this situation, following the financial
constraints imposed by Prime Minister Li Peng, a number of rural enterprises went
bankrupt. When the central government imposed an economic slowdown in 1989, a
growing  number  of  rural  migrants  from  the  countryside  headed  for  the  cities,
particularly around the New Year period (11). Given the heightened social tensions and
the large concentrations of migrants drawn to the main urban centres, the consequent
reaction was panic in towns and cities (12).
From “hooligan” (liumang) to “blind migrant” (mangliu)
5 In the late 1980s, the Chinese media were already raising concerns about the “flood of
migrants”  (mingongchao)  causing  disturbances  in  cities.  The  term  “blind  migrant”
(mangliu)  played  a  major  role  in  these  reports.  The  term  itself  is  a  homophonic
inversion of liumang, a pejorative expression roughly equivalent to “hooligan”. The
inverted term consists of two characters: the first, mang, means “blind”, and is itself
made up of  the  character  (wang),  which in  classical  Chinese  means  “disappear”  or
“lose”,  and  the  character  (mu)  which  means  “eye”.  The  second  character  in  the
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expression is liu, meaning “flow” or “float”, as opposed to everything rooted, fixed or
stable. The character liu is to be found in a whole series of expressions referring to
wandering  or  migration,  all  of  which  are  historically  associated  with  disturbances
bringing  about  population  displacements  (13).  Liumang  likewise  includes  the  same
character liu, combined with mang, which in former times meant “leaving or being
forced to leave one’s native land”. Under the Qing dynasty, the term liumang acquired
the  meaning  of  “hooligan”.  So  this  term,  and  indirectly  its  homophonic  inversion
mangliu, are loaded with symbolic associations.
6 But attention should also be paid to the way in which the term mangliu was mobilised
in the early years of  the communist regime and, more to the point,  when the first
measures were taken to handle the presence of the peasants in cities, and population
mobility in general. Mangliu is a term closely linked to official disapproval of migration
from the countryside to the cities.
7 At first, in 1950, freedom of movement was guaranteed by Article 5 of the common
programme, but on August 3rd 1952 the first official resolution aimed at “dissuading
the peasants from entering blindly into the cities” (14) was adopted. At that time, the
logic underlying this position was a deep anxiety about possible social instability in the
towns, which was a reaction to movements from the countryside to the main urban
centres within a still precarious situation. Cheng Tiejun notes that two threads can be
detected running through this document. The first of these is the idea that there is a
difference between under-employment in the countryside and in the cities, the latter
being the only real under-employment to be avoided. The second is simply typical of
the way all governments have understood spontaneous movements by the population:
they are blind and need to be controlled.
8 This  first  resolution  was  followed  on  March  17th  1953  by  an  official  “directive
concerning the discouragement of the blind influx of the peasants into towns”, which
was published in the People’s Daily on the following day by the Premier Zhou Enlai. The
reasons were clearly spelt out: “(…) At present, since urban building has hardly started,
the demand for labour is limited. Consequently, the arrival of peasants in cities means
that the number of unemployed in towns is increasing, which causes administrative
problems,  while  in  the  countryside  the  reduced  availability  of  labour  means  that
agricultural work is disrupted, leading to losses in production (…)”.
9 Seven  measures  were  adopted.  The  authorities  at  the  different  levels  of  the
administration were requested to “patiently explain matters  to those peasants who
wish or intend to move to a town, and to dissuade them from doing so … When the time
comes for urban construction to seek more workers, the governments of the townships
and prefectures will be officially notified, [so that] they can recruit in a planned and
organised manner”. They are advised “to show prudence when sending the peasants
back, to pay the transport costs of those in difficulty (…) and to provide appropriate aid
to  those  facing  immediate constraints”.  The  last  part  of  the  directive  concerns
recruitment by work units, stipulating that they must communicate their manpower
needs to the departments of labour and construction management, in order to receive
an organised and planned allocation of labour (15).
10 A series of articles published in the People’s Daily sets out the details of this resolution
and  comments  upon  it.  These  commentaries  show  a  tougher  official  attitude  to
unorganised migration, which will dominate the thinking of the urban elite right into
the 1980s and 1990s. In fact it was as early as 1953 that expressions such as “blindly
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leave the countryside” ( , mangmu waichu), “blindly penetrate” ( , mangmu liuru) were
endlessly repeated in newspaper articles and official documents, becoming more or less
automatically associated with peasant mobility and presence in the towns. This gave
birth to the term “blind migrant” (mangliu), which can be considered as a contraction
of “blindly penetrate” (mangmu liuru). The different levels of the administration were
required to show their  skill  in  persuasion by “patiently explaining to any peasants
preparing to head for towns, that going blindly into the towns held out no advantages,
either  for  the  country  or  for  the  peasants  themselves,  and  that  they  should  stay
peacefully at home and develop agricultural production” (17). It was also from 1953
onwards that the government set out its targets for the first five-year plan (1953-1957)
and gradually introduced a system for restricting access to towns. The consequences of
the  peasants’  moving  to  towns  were  listed:  increases  in  excess  labour  in  towns,  a
decline in social order, negative effects on agricultural production, pressures on urban
infrastructure etc. To remedy these problems, within the framework of collectivisation
in agriculture, the primary need was defined as “resolving all the problems in peasant
thinking (….). Dissuading the peasant from blindly penetrating into towns is not only
imperative for the task of raising national consciousness but is also in the true interests
of the peasants” (18).
11 As the principal factors affecting mobility (jobs, housing, food supplies) passed under
state control, in tandem with the establishment of a national population registration
system, the tone of the official directives and other measures dealing with migration
from the  countryside  to  the  towns,  progressively  hardened.  The  “blind”  individual
interest of the peasants moving to the towns on their own initiative was contrasted
with  the  collective  interest  represented  by  industrialisation  and  collectivised
agricultural production. Forced repatriation was added to the tasks of persuading and
educating the peasants. In December 1957, a directive laid down that, alongside the
tasks of educating the rural masses and organising agricultural production, emphasis
should be given to controlling towns through residence permits, establishing reception
centres ( , shourongsuo) there, organising work for the arrested to enable them to pay
for their return journey, and effecting their repatriation (19).
12 The  directive  concerning  the  registration  of  the  population in  January  1958  (20)
formally abolished the freedom to choose the place of domicile, and getting a permit to
migrate from countryside to town became a matter of tortuous procedures which made
it  very difficult  (21).  This  directive was one among many other  official  documents,
which led to setting up a fundamental opposition between rural migrations on the one
hand and the actions of the state on the other. The former were perceived as non-
organised  phenomena  (  ,  wu  zuzhi),  unplanned  (  ,  wu  jihua),  disordered  and  even
irrational―since migrants who blindly left the countryside ( ,  mangmu waichu) and
plunged  equally  blindly  into  cities  (  ,  mangmu  yongru),  were  the  cause  of  urban
disorders (from security to food supplies),―while the state’s actions restored “strict
control” ( , yange kongzhi) over these population flows, by sending migrants back to
the countryside, now that their presence in towns had become illegal (22). Within this
logic,  sending the peasants back to the countryside was aimed at enabling them to
“work peaceably” at their agricultural tasks (an’an de wunong). 
Struggles in the late 1980s: the legitimacy of peasant migration versus the pejorative
term mangliu
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13 The dominant ways in which migrations and migrants themselves were represented in
the late 1980s and early 1990s shared a number of similar traits with those of the 1950s.
There is the same opposition between spontaneous migrations, which were necessarily
disorganised, and those planned and organised by the state. Another factor reminiscent
of the 1950s is the range of measures stipulated for the incarceration and repatriation
of  migrants.  An  article  in  the  journal  Society  in  1990  proposes  that  the  reception
centres  be  expanded,  and  that  labour  camps  be  set  up,  together  with  a  system of
compulsory repayment of the costs of repatriation. It states that in Shanghai “among
the population from outside the city are a large number of people belonging to the
mangliu category who should be locked up and thrown out”. To deal with this need to
incarcerate  more, the  Shanghai  authorities  “must  undertake  the  renovation  and
enlargement of the closed labour centres (…). To handle those elements who persist in
their errors, but whose criminal behaviour is not sufficient to draw the attention of the
police,  the  policy  to  be  followed  must  combine  education  with  work  provision,
investigation and repatriation (23). Thanks to education through labour and a short
period of education in the law (lasting three to six months),  they must be made to
understand the harm caused by their migration, so that they become aware of the error
of their ways, amend them, and migrate no more (…) (24).
14 In a number of articles, spontaneous migrations to towns are frequently labelled blind
for being opposed to the Party’s policy of controlled migration. Even a publication like
Nongmin Ribao (Peasants’ Daily), which has a reputation for defending the peasants’
cause, takes up the dominant terminology when it is a matter of setting out a policy for
“encouraging the transfer of rural populations to the townships, as well as to the small
and medium towns, so as to get control of the blind migration of peasants to towns”
(25). The Nongmin Ribao journalists very rarely refer to “blind migrations”, and in this
particular instance it is used to refer explicitly to illegal peasant movement. From being
legal and encouraged when officially directed towards the townships and small and
medium towns, peasant migrations become “blind” when they clash with the official
line.
15 In describing these “blind migrations”, the stress is often placed on their irrational
character, and this is linked, among other factors, to the assertion that the peasants are
driven out by poverty, which could lead to an “endless multitude of peasants” arriving
in towns (26). In most cases, the decision to leave their village is said to be taken lightly
by these “blind migrants”, as they are prompted by rumours to make for the towns and
try  their  luck.  The  poverty  of  the  countryside  is  invoked  to  explain  the  blind
irrationality of this behaviour, as well as their unrestrained lust to get money by any
available means. The writers of Mangliu! Mangliu!, for example, affirm that the teams
of migrant workers in the construction industry “operate in a totally blind manner.
They go where there is work, where there is money to be earned, and money is their
only motive. They have no feasibility study [sic] . They have no collective sense, and
respond only to their thirst for money …”. Likewise, their poverty is said to be the
reason why they see no point in signing contracts.  The same goes for the way the
women are  exploited in  domestic  service,  for  “[if]  these  people  agree to  be  bossed
about, it’s because they are too poor”. The “child labourers” are also “too poor”; they
have to rely solely on their physical strength, because “their cultural level is too low”.
This is also why “they accept unequal treatment like cattle, putting up with hard labour
and insults” (27).  In many descriptions of the illegal activities of the mangliu, their
Debates and Classification Struggles Regarding the Representation of Migrants...
China Perspectives, 65 | may - june 2006
5
thirst  for  money  is  linked to  moralistic  condemnation,  whether  it  is  a  question  of
prostitution, begging, drug trafficking, or other petty crime. Their lust for money is
seen as defining them, depriving them of individual will and unfailingly pushing them
into illegal acts. That is why a number of newspaper articles and books provide “typical
portraits” of people capable of morally reprehensible and sometimes legally punishable
behaviour.
16 It  sometimes happens that this  irrationality is  bolstered by abnormal behaviour,  as
suggested in the following analogy used to describe migrant women: “ … although their
hopes are blind and baseless,  they still  come … At first  they are like headless  flies
banging into things at every turn”. The author then goes on to describe the activities of
two mangliu: “These mangliu have no need to seek a temporary residence permit, or to
worry about where they will spend the night. They possess a great deal of personal
freedom and adaptability,  enabling them to think of nothing but profit  and getting
money; they will do anything to put money in their pockets ( , laoqian (28))”. In another
article,  the  changes  experienced  by  peasants  who  have  moved  to  the  towns  are
compared with the changes experienced by “monkeys who have come down from the
trees” (29). In another article, a migrant woman is described as “an innocent goat”, and
young women who have left their village are portrayed as “little birds in search of food,
far from their  ancestral  land and their  cosy nest” (30).  This kind of  representation
helps to create an image of migrants as fundamentally “other”, in absolute contrast
with the citizens who alone have the right qualities and attributes to live legally in a
town. A simplifying cause-and-effect relationship linking poverty to migration, apart
from contributing to the image of migration as a manifestation of disorder, masks the
historical  and political  aspects of the polarity of town and countryside.  But in fact,
studies have shown that migrations in China, just as elsewhere in the world, are only
rarely  undertaken  by  the  poorest  and  least  educated  (31).  Moreover,  many
investigations have established that, even as early as the 1980s, most migrants do not
set out on a blind quest but, on the contrary, rely on networks or “chains” of support
between  their  native  village  and  their  destination  (32).  To  explain  the  causes  of
migration by reducing them to economic factors alone gives a very partial account of
this complex phenomenon (33). 
17 The fairly frequent recourse to hydraulic metaphors to describe the flow of migrants
penetrating  into  the towns  is  yet  another  procedure  which  contributes  towards
homogenising  and  “othering”  them.  Articles  talk  endlessly  of  “floods  of  migrants”
(mingongchao), the “flood tide of migrants” ( , mingong dachao), or “great waves of
migrants” ( , mingong langchao). Other expressions also refer to their large numbers,
such  as  “the  immense  floating  population”  (  ,  pangda  de  liudong  renkou),  the
“ceaselessly growing floating population” ( , buduan zengjia de liudong renkou), the
“huge army of mangliu” (  ,  mangliu dajun),  the “horde of social  burdens” (  ,  baofu
duiwu),  the  “hordes  of  over  ten  thousand  egg-sellers”  (  ,  shangwanren  de  maidan
duiwu), the “great army of millions of mangliu” ( ,  baiwan mangliu dajun), and the
“shock  troops of  excessive  births”  (  ,  chaosheng  youjidui)  etc.  In  most  cases  such
expressions invoke disorder ( , luan), filth and crime, enabling the emphasis to fall on
the sudden, violent and overwhelming character of the migrants’ arrival in towns. Such
descriptions reinforce the idea of towns being literally under siege.
18 The arrival of rural migrants, and their continuing presence in towns, is frequently
associated with pressures on urban infrastructures and threats to social order in the
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towns. A front page article in the daily Guangming Ribao is a good illustration of this:
“Once the New Year festival is over, masses of migrants from the provinces of Sichuan,
Henan, Hubei, Shandong, Shaanxi, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang emigrate. Most of them float
blindly on the current, naively believing every rumour (…) The large number of these
blind migrants puts enormous pressure on the railways, and causes chaos ( , hunluan)
for the security services. Consequently, this enormous crowd of mangliu is of no benefit
to the country or the people (…). This extraordinarily violent flood of mangliu batters
the four corners of Hainan Island like a tidal wave, and disturbs the political and social
order of even that large Special Economic Zone (34).
19 In a  great  many articles,  the various harmful  effects  of  the migrants’  presence are
listed, even though the point is  often clearly made that it  also brings benefits.  The
pressures on urban infrastructure affect urban planning, transport, housing, markets,
security,  the  environment,  hygiene,  birth  control etc.  (35).  The  need  to  control,
incarcerate, and expel them is generally asserted. Some of these articles are veritable
models of  how to homogenise,  stigmatise and even demonise.  An article in Renkou
Dongtai appearing under the headline: “The influence of the floating populations on
city  life  and  environment,  and  an  analysis  of  its  causes”,  summons  up  images  of
saturation or super-saturation, pollution and destruction. The major damage alleged by
the author is the irrational use of urban spaces, due to the fact that migrants live in
cabins which “ruin the urban landscape and, more importantly, take up large areas
(…)”  These  barbarian  take-overs  “are  an  ever-present  danger  to  agricultural
production, causing a scarcity of water and other resources” (such as grain, firewood,
green spaces). The environment inhabited by the floating population is “polluted and
chaotic” permitting “all sorts of contagious diseases to flourish, and causing a rise in
infections and mortality”. Moreover, migrants are described as introducing “infectious
diseases which are normally rare in towns”. Another charge is added: “The floating
population adds to noise pollution in cities” because the cries of the street peddlers
“disturb  the  lives  and  the  calm  of  the  citizenry”.  In  addition,  “they  increase  air
pollution” because of the extra public transport required, plus that caused by their own
vehicles, plus the coal they burn for heating.
20 The  second  part  of  the  same article  moves  on  from the  sheer  size  of  the  floating
population to put forward the “cultural” and “moral” reasons which explain why they
ruin the urban environment. The writer argues that the floating population “does not
possess the necessary attributes for living in a modern town (…). As for its cultural
level, it lacks the public morality and civic qualities that city dwellers must have (…). In
short,  the problem is that the low cultural level of the floating population leads to
chaos in the living spaces of the town and pollutes its environment”. Finally, once again
the migrants’  short-term behaviour and exclusive focus on money is described as a
defining characteristic. The writer concludes with his solution to these problems, that
control and education are needed for “people who blindly penetrate into cities” (36).
These  articles  put  most  of  the  responsibility  for  the  problems  they  raise  onto  the
shoulders  of  migrants  themselves,  blaming their  attitudes,  mentality,  morality,  and
poor education. What we find in fact is an essentialising process, through which the
origins of the problems are found to lie in the culture of the individuals concerned.
21 Zhang  Li  describes  the  three  principal  modes  of  representing  migrants  firstly  as
unifying and homogenising, secondly as dehistoricising and dehumanising, and thirdly
as abnormalising (38). On the whole I would agree with this typology. However, there
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are some writers who criticise these ways of  misrepresenting them, by introducing
historical  and  political  perspectives  into  their  analyses,  as  well  as  structural
approaches, in an attempt to bring out the unique specificity of the path followed by
each individual migrant. The latter is no longer seen as simply merged into a mass,
fleeing from poverty and frantically scrambling for money.
Migration and the reforms
22 A number of writers criticise the way migrations are linked with disturbances, and the
categorising use of the label “blind migrants” (mangliu). Their prime point is to insist
on  a  difference  between  contemporary  and  past  migrations,  the  latter  being
synonymous with unrest (39). They establish this difference by linking modern mobility
with the economic reforms and the shift to a market economy (40). This association
between mobility and economic reforms allows them to dismiss the usefulness of the
term “blind migrants” (41). These writers argue for the adoption of “new solutions for
new  problems”,  meaning  the  need  to  guide  and  direct  instead  of  obstructing  and
expelling (42). This is a very important point. They attack the use of terms like mangliu
because they recognise and emphasise that it is linked to the practices of incarceration
and expulsion, which they consider indiscriminate. (43). As one writer explains: “For
the  last  month or  two,  the  phenomenon of  peasants  trapped in  several  towns  has
appeared. All of a sudden, rural labourers have become “burdens” and mangliu. (…) Is
this  a  fair  judgement?” In the next  paragraph he lists  the benefits  brought  by the
mobile rural labour force. He goes on to admit that there is inevitably a “blind” element
in this mobility, but he affirms that in general it shows a certain regularity, and that
consequently one cannot call the body of migrant peasants mangliu. He distinguishes
present day migrations from those of the past, because “their mobility is an economic
activity  within  the  framework  of  the  market  economy”.  He  acknowledges  that  the
presence of migrants in the town poses certain problems, and that some measures need
to be taken. Nonetheless, he continues, it is not right to “flush them all out of town”
(44). The refusal to use the term mangliu to describe migrants is linked to questioning
the  way  migrations  are  explained  solely  in  terms  of  poverty  and  a  single-minded
pursuit of profits. The explanation becomes more complex when structural, historical
and psychological factors are taken into account. The writer of an article published in
the  journal  Society  in  1991  highlights  “the  rather  frequent  but  mistaken  outlook
involved in discussing the question of the mingongchao: the very term mingongchao is
the equivalent of mangliu, and mangliu means disaster”. As for the motives behind the
migrations,  he puts forward a desire, not only for a higher income but “to see the
world”. He cautions against a simplistic causal link between demographic pressure and
migration, criticising superficial analyses which take only demographic pressure and
economic  recession  into  account.  He  concludes  that  this  leads  to  the  view  that
“unemployed peasants have become an unorganised force attacking the medium-sized
towns and coastal  cities,  that  is  to  say,  the mangliu  on everybody’s  lips”.  Actually,
migrations should be explained by the dual structure of society and the economy, and
by the disparities between town and country. He argues that the thesis which equates
the mingongchao with blind migration and chaos is “clearly a reflection of urban value
judgements”, and these ought to be seen “in direct relationship with the policy which,
up until the present, has favoured the towns and heavy industry” (45). So there are
indeed  some  writers  who,  rather  than  setting  up  a  direct  causal  link  between  the
essential characteristics of migrants and the problems facing cities, draw attention to
the  historical  and  political  dimensions  in  order  to  explain  contemporary  labour
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mobility and the problems encountered by the towns (46). Their criticism is directed
principally at the residency permit system and the dual structure of Chinese society.
23 Let us return briefly to the discussions which associate the economic reforms with the
market  economy on  the  one  hand,  and  migratory  movements  on  the  other.  These
discussions take place within the wider framework of the debates between reformists
and conservatives over the economic reforms and opening up to the outer world. After
September  1987,  readjustment  measures  were  introduced  to  put  a  brake  on  the
economic reforms, and in the late 1980s and early 1990s the clash between reformists
and conservatives over the extent of the reforms already undertaken, was particularly
acute. I would like to emphasise the similarity in the terms used by the defenders of the
need  to  strengthen  macro-economic  controls  over  the  Chinese  economy  and  those
deployed by writers describing the “blind migrations”, which likewise are said to need
control through state intervention. Indeed, for certain conservative officials, “if prices
were  controlled  spontaneously  through  the  market”,  it  follows  that  “economic
development would be blind”. Only long-term planning could avoid such chaos and loss
of authority (47). For Chen Yun, planning represents order and rationality, while the
market  is  synonymous  with  blindness.  He  distinguishes  between  “the  guidance
provided by planning” and the rules of the market, which “allow the blind forces of
supply and demand to determine production” (48).
24 In articles dealing with labour migration, certain expressions can also be found which
explicitly invoke measures to slow down and control economic growth. For example
the reader is told that one of the causes for the big influx of migrants into towns in
1989  was  the  recession  caused  by  the  measures  of rectification  (  ,  zhengdun)  and
adjustment ( , tiaozheng), particularly in the rural enterprises. In a work published by
journalists from the People’s Daily, the policy of “cleansing” ( , qingli) the towns was
openly criticised, and the contradictions were laid bare between the rectification ( ,
zhengdun) measures imposed in cities  and the policy of  exporting rural  manpower
adopted by certain provinces. The writers explain that at the height of the cleansing
campaign in the towns, Party officials in Sichuan province gave orders to continue the
exportation of rural  manpower,  and even attempted to find new outlets for it  (49).
Elsewhere too,  the “readjustment” policy is  linked with “clearing out  the mangliu”
(50). 
25 To affirm a close connection between mobility  and the market  economy through a
narrowly  economist  discourse,  also  means  to  endow that  mobility  with  a  rationale
which conflicts with the definition of migration as a blind and irrational phenomenon.
From being a manifestation of blind irrationality,  migrations suddenly become “the
unavoidable outcome of the reforms and opening up (…), the inevitable product of the
development of a socialist  market economy (…),  the inevitable historical product of
socialist  modernisation  and  urbanisation”  (51),  or  even  “a  rational  and  realistic
historical necessity” (52). Several writers appropriate the metaphor of the tide used by
the detractors of the migrations and reverse its meaning: from being a force that sows
disorder  in  society,  it  becomes a  force  for  transformation,  enabling the renewal  of
creative vitality. According to the People’s Daily, “the wave of peasant workers waxes
and wanes according to the rhythms of growth (…); in that respect it clearly displays
the characteristics of the market economy in its developmental phase”. This onrushing
wave may nonetheless contain a potential threat to the townsfolk insofar as it calls the
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urban  status  quo  into  question,  especially  with  regard  to  the  availability  of  urban
services (53).
26 A particularly vivid illustration of this calling into question is provided in the following
extract from an article headed “The shockwave shaking our town walls”. Referring to
the  stagnation  in  agricultural  production,  the  author  writes,  “People  have  finally
understood. It is not because there is a lack of manpower in the countryside, but rather
because there is no competition and no mobility, that eight hundred million peasants
are tied hand and foot to a limited area of arable land, like creepers around an old tree.
Their intelligence and skills have been stifled, their vitality has declined, and society
has lost its energy. (…) The wave of goods produced for the market has hit the old
villages and their dying fields. Millions upon millions of surplus labourers have joined
this  unstoppable  tidal  wave.  The  floodgates  have  been  smashed,  and  the  spirit  of
individual initiative and creativity, repressed for so long, is suddenly bursting out. The
peasants have plunged in headlong, wherever they see a chance to earn a living and
develop their skills, without bothering first to wash the mud off their faces or the cow
dung off their feet (…). Feeling the shock of this onrushing wave, the town dweller,
sitting comfortably in his solid armchair and eating from the state-provided “big pot”,
has begun to experience the crisis  for himself,  and the consequent need to lift  the
curtains and slowly let in the reforms” (54).  Here the economics of the market are
presented as positive forces for change (55), for the peasants have been awoken from
their slumbers by the market economy: “… at present the ideas of the market economy
are besieging the whole country, and it is as though many people are suddenly realising
that the outside world is full of wonders” (56).
27 Whereas  those  publications  that  represent  the  peasant  migrations  as  the  source  of
disorder  call  for  the  control,  incarceration  and  eventual  expulsion  of  the  “blind
migrants”,  those that associate the migrations with the reforms sometimes call  the
social hierarchy itself into question. For them, it is the “old and rigid” urban planning
system, and the dual structure of society with its residence permits, which need to be
reformed, having effectively lost all legitimacy. Responsibility for the current situation
is  turned  on  its  head.  It  is  no  longer  migrants  who  are  responsible  for  urban
disturbances, but the failure of the state to plan and manage a proper labour market
and to  provide  adequate  services  to  migrants  in  towns  (57).  This  revelation of  the
state’s responsibility allows some of these writers to broach the question of migrants’
rights in cities, and to claim on their behalf the right to certain resources and services.
Thus, in a major study of the floating populations, Li Mengbai makes a strong case: “We
must immediately adopt a welcoming attitude towards them, actively provide them
with  the  conditions  and  services  needed  to  support  their  legitimate  activities,  and
recognise  their  rights  and  duties  without  discrimination  equal  to  those  of  other
inhabitants of the towns” (58). Another writer argues that it is the mindset from the
past which must be changed: “… we cannot go on refusing equal rights to the peasants.
They must be able to participate in the modernisation process, and therefore enjoy its
benefits (…). Seen objectively, the emergence of the mingongchao is a challenge to the
urban protectionism concealed within our approach to development”. This writer also
considers that towns must increase their ability to welcome migrants (59).
From undifferentiated masses to individual itineraries
28 In  1990,  two journalists  from the People’s  Daily  published an investigative work in
which the question of migrants’ rights was central. In this work, the writers reverse the
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alleged causal relationship between the presence of migrants and urban disturbances.
If migrants were to leave the towns, they write, it is the normal urban functions which
would be disturbed, putting an end to the towns’ prosperity (60). They also insist on the
need to focus on individual paths so as to demonstrate that the mangliu category may
not  be  used  indifferently.  This  is  not  the  only  work  to  emphasise  the  migrants’
individual itineraries, but all too often, when the homogenising and undifferentiated
register  of  representations  is  left  behind  in  favour  of  describing  such  individually
chosen  itineraries,  the  latter  end  up  as  deviations  from  the  norm,  which  merely
reconfirms the dominant representation.  These two authors have opted to describe
those who fail but who do not necessarily fall into the category of mangliu or criminals.
For instance, writing about a young woman from Sichuan who refuses to work as a
prostitute,  despite  having failed several  times in previous jobs,  they point  out  that
“although she is among the migrant workers who have failed, she cannot in any sense
be labelled a mangliu”. Their individual subjects display a personal will, they have a
name, and they are active subjects. The writers make clear that many individuals who
might appear to be mangliu but are in fact not, are women. Instead of despising them
and rejecting them by calling them mangliu, local governments ought to be helping
them and giving them support (61).
29 In sum, peasant migrations and the presence of migrants in towns are problematised in
different ways, according to the writer’s central tenets, i.e. whether he holds onto the
state as the guarantor of order and the status quo on the one hand, or the market and
the economic reforms on the other. Depending on whether one or the other of these
positions  occupies  the  centre  of  the  argument,  the  series  of  oppositions  which  it
generates produce very different images of the migrant and migratory movements. It is
tempting to reduce these oppositions, such as order/disorder, stability/instability, lack
of civic sense/qualities of the modern town dweller, to the fundamental issue of the
legitimacy  or  the  partial  and  highly  circumscribed  legitimacy,  of  the  migrants’
presence in the towns. In the first case, migrants are described primarily in terms of
what  they lack  (62),  in  an essentially  negative  manner.  Whatever  positive  qualities
might characterise both migrants and migratory movements are negated in the face of
those  represented  by  the  legitimate  town  dweller.  By  way  of  contrast,  when  the
migrations  are  associated with the  reforms and the market  economy,  they become
synonymous with dynamism, openness, and innovation, in opposition to the system of
central planning, which is then seen as symbolising rigidity, stagnation and archaic
structures.
An ongoing discussion
30 The “blind migrant” category is closely associated with allegations of various social
disorders and with the practices of incarceration and repatriation. In the early 1950s,
“blind migration” meant illegal  migration on account of  its  opposition to the State
policy of industrialisation and collectivisation. Because of this, “blind migration”, “to
migrate blindly”, and “blind migrant” are actually political categories. In this respect it
is interesting to compare them with the way immigration is conceived in the West.
Didier Bigo calls this “governing through anxiety”, and he argues that the discourses
calling for the securing of borders, and their practical effects in terms of a whole range
of  security  institutions,  should  be  considered  “a  political  technology,  and  a
contemporary  mode  of  government”.  He  shows  to  what  extent  immigration  is
constructed as  though it  were a  self-evident category,  thus encapsulating “a whole
network  of  meanings  with  security  implications,  and  allowing  certain  exceptional
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practices to appear to the population at large as solutions to a single problem”. The
discourse of security surrounding the question of immigration, particularly through
the way it allows a complex of social questions to be simplified, enables immigration to
be tied to a series of issues like “globalisation, urbanisation, unemployment, and the
birth rate” (63). Similarly, in the case of China, the “blind migrant” (mangliu) category
bundles together a range of quite different social  problems, such as the inadequate
urban infrastructures, the rise in criminality, and environmental degradation.
31 The  perspective  which  presents  things  in  terms  of  threats  and  disturbances,
accompanied  by  the  practices  of  incarceration  and  repatriation  aimed  at  specific
categories  of  individuals,  is  in  my  view  very  close  to  what  Aiwha  Ong  has  called
“graduated  sovereignty”,  meaning  in  the  case  of  China  the  single  party  state’s
application of different regimes of civility and discipline to different sections of the
population  (64).  This  differential  application  is  conducted  through  a  process  of
“visibilization” and observation of the different categories of migrants in cities and
here one only has to consider the proliferation of agencies and personnel responsible
for managing migrants. Dean Mitchell considers that, in order to operate effectively,
certain  kinds  of  government  require  a  policy  of  “highlighting and defining  certain
objects”, making them visible by simultaneously obscuring others (65). This process of
constituting a governmental space, and the categories which it requires, is reminiscent
of the “Panopticon” as a figure of political technology in Michel Foucault’s analysis. Its
dominant principle is  to maximise the visibility of  those “who must be disciplined,
surveyed, and understood” (66). Numerous works have emphasised the discrimination
suffered  by  rural  migrants  in  cities.  These  include  arbitrary  restraints,  and  the
proliferation  of  informal  regulations  concerning  housing,  the  right  to  work,  birth
control etc. (67). People from the countryside are subjected to a large-scale invasion of
their private lives by the party state (68), the extent of which varies according to the
different category migrants belong to, the kind of work they do and its concomitant
prestige,  and  the  nature  of  their  relationship  with  the  various  levels  of  the
administration (69).  Under the conditions in post-Mao China, the residential  permit
system has led to a situation of institutional discrimination backed by legal ambiguity,
and it affects migrants as soon as they are in a town, turning them into “immigrants
from  the  interior”  (70).  These  control  mechanisms  (residential  and  work  permits)
operate concomitantly with the discourse on disorder, to make the migrants outsiders
on the margins of society (71).
32 While the “blind migrant” categorisation was at the centre of public debates in the late
1980s and early 1990s, it has subsequently lost that central position, not to disappear
entirely but to be used intermittently, whenever there has been a campaign aimed at
controlling,  incarcerating,  and  expelling  migrants  found  without  the  documents
needed to live in cities. In the late 1980s, “blind migrant” was common currency in
everyday speech. Françoise Poglia-Mileti has pointed out that “in order for categories
referring  to  alterity  (in  thought,  action,  definition  of  the  “other”  etc.)  to  become
commonly accepted, and to be treated as inseparable aspects of a social problem, they
must first acquire a visible presence and enter the public domain” (72). Conversely,
throughout  the 1990s,  as  public  perception of  the migrations  from the countryside
gradually changed, the “blind migrant” category fell out of common usage. 
33 This change can be most clearly seen in the press publications from the Pearl River
Delta area. There the discussions of the problems caused by migration at the time of the
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New Year festival were markedly different from those in the Beijing press in the same
period, for example, and from the articles of the 1980s which I quoted earlier. Distinctly
less dramatic in tone, they also give more space to the views of migrants themselves,
and they tend more towards describing the migrations as ordinary phenomena (73). In
fact, it was in the Special Economic Zones of the Pearl River Delta in the early 1990s
that the press first gave migrants an image that was very distant from the usual one of
undifferentiated and threatening masses. In that decade the figure of the “legitimate
migrant worker” emerged. As for the “blind migrant” category, it continued to make
sporadic  reappearances  as  a  synonym  for  the  “three  withouts”  (  ,  sanwu:  people
without identity documents, residence permits, or regular employment). This retains
its  potential  for  stigmatisation,  which is  always reinforced and virtually  unopposed
during the “cleansing campaigns” (74). Still, the “blind migrant” category has changed
from being a political and common sense category, to being only a public intervention. .
34 We have seen that,  by being associated with the economic reforms and the market
economy,  migratory  movements  could  be  described  in  rather  positive  terms.
Frequently this kind of discourse gives precedence to purely economic arguments, as a
consequence  of  the modernisation  model  predominant  in  China’s  journalistic  and
intellectual  circles  (75).  Although it  inverts  the  image  of  migration  as  a  source  of
disorder, it is no less homogenising. As the mental product of a section of the urban
elite, it makes the migrants’ legitimate status depend upon their work, and in so doing
it continues to assign them to a position opposed to that of the majority of people living
in towns (76).
35 Moreover, in many of the publications dealing with migration, even as early as the
1980s the emergence of a certain idealising conception of the market and the market
economy can be detected, bestowing upon it an actively liberating role. According to
this approach, by bringing peasants into close contact with the market and the towns,
the  migrations  will  allow  them  to  move  from  their  “traditional  subjectivity”  to  a
“modern” one (77). This idea of individual transformation thanks to migration is by no
means unique to China. What does distinguish the Chinese case is the extent to which
the Party and the urban elite are deeply implicated in producing the discourses which
magnify the attraction to the towns,  thus reinforcing what Lisa Hoffman calls  “the
cultural  hierarchies  of  opportunity  and  stagnation”  (78).  However,  it  should  be
emphasised  that  since  the  late  1990s  the  neo-liberal  myths  of  the  market  and  the
capitalist system have become objects of intense intellectual debate. 
36 I  have noted earlier  that from the 1980s onwards,  some writers have broached the
question of migrants’ rights, thus implicitly questioning the social hierarchy itself. This
discourse centred on rights is currently at the heart of the debate over the dearth of
rural labour force in certain areas of the country. Since the 1990s the migrants’ cause
has  made  gradual  headway,  both  in  the  media  and  in  central  and  municipal
government circles. These authorities are beginning to talk about the need to provide
services for migrants and to safeguard their rights.
37 Whereas the studies produced by governmental and semi-governmental institutes have
approached  migrations  primarily  from  the  angle  of  social  order,  along  with  the
advantages and disadvantages brought about by the presence of migrants in towns,
sociological studies published during the 1990s, which focus more on the problems and
experiences of  the migrants themselves,  seem to have had an influence on current
public debates (80). As Chloé Froissart has pointed out, there has been a shift in the
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attitude of the central government towards migrants. This has led to a series of official
measures aimed at protecting their rights in towns, as well as considerably relaxing the
rules governing their residency and access to jobs (81). There is a great deal at stake
here, and it remains to be seen whether the goal of reducing the disparities between
town and countryside, and between rich and poor, announced at the Sixteenth Party
Congress, will have any effect.
38 I would like to thank the editors and the two anonymous readers for their suggested
improvements to the first draft of this article.
39 On this question, see Anita Chan, “Recent Trends in Chinese Labour Issues—Signs of
Change”, China Perspectives, No. 57, January-February 2005, pp. 23-31.
40 Mingong (W), is a contraction of nongmin (WW, peasant) and gongren (WW, worker). It
is  often translated  as  “peasant  worker”,  but  in  this  article  I  will translate  it  as
“migrant”.
41 See in particular Delia Davin, “Migrants and the Media: Concerns about Rural Migrants
in the Chinese Press”, in Loraine A. West and Zhao Yaohui, Rural Labor Flows in China,
Berkeley, The University of California Press, 2003, pp. 278-291; Delia Davin, Internal
Migration in  Contemporary  China,  New York,  St.  Martin’s  Press,  1991,  pp.  151-154;
Tamara  Jacka,  “Working  sisters  answer  back:  the  representation  and  self-
representation of women in China’s floating population”, China Information, Vol. Xlll,
No.  1,  Summer 1998,  pp.  43-75;  Zhang Li,  Strangers  in  the  City:  Reconfiguration of
Space,  Power,  and  Social  Networks  within  China’s  Floating  Population,  Stanford,
Stanford  University  Press,  2001;  Zhang  Li,  “Contesting  Crime,  Order,  and  Migrant
Spaces  in  Beijing”,  in  Nancy Chen et  al.  (eds.),  Ethnographies  of  the Urban in Late
Twentieth Century China,  Durham and London,  Duke University  Press,  pp.  201-224;
Zhao Yuezhi, “The Rich, the Laid-off, and the Criminal in Tabloid Tales: Read all about
it!”,  in Perry Link, Richard P.  Madsen and Paul Pickowitz,  Popular China: Unofficial
culture in a globalizing society, Lanham, Rowman, and Littlefield, 2002, pp. 111-135.
42 Judith Banister, “Internal and Regional Migration Trends”, in Thomas Scharping (ed.),
Floating  Population  and  Migration  in  China:  The  Impact  of  Economic  Reforms,
Hamburg, Mitteilungen des Instituts für Asienkunde, 1997, p. 88.
43 This analysis deals with 75 articles published in the national press (i.e., Renmin ribao–
People’s  Daily;  Nongmin  ribao–Peasants’  Daily;  Guangmin  ribao–Clarity  Daily;  Fazhi
ribao–Legal Daily; Jingji ribao–Economics Daily), and 29 items of reportage literature
taken from political science journals. In addition, extracts were taken from six works of
reportage  literature:  Dong  Jie,  Cai  Zhiqiang,  and  Guan Wenhao,  Mangliu!  Mangliu!,
Shenyang, Liaoning renmin chubanshe, 1990; Ge Xiangxian and Qu Weiying, Zhongguo
mingongchao, Hebei, Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 1990; Zheng Nian, Chao lu,
chao zhang: mingongchao toushi, Beijing, Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 1991;
Yang  Shen,  Xiongyong  mingongchao,  Guangxi,  Guangzhou  chubanshe,  1993;  Wang
Haiping,  Mangliu  chongjibo,  Beijing,  Shoudou  shifandaxue  chubanshe,  1993;  Wang
Lingxu, Doushili de moshengren, bianwai shimin shenghuo jishi, Shanghai, Shanghai
shehui, kexueyuan chuban, 1993.
44 Nilolas  S.  Rose,  Powers  of  Freedom:  Reframing  Political  Thought,  Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1999; Mitchell Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule in
Modern Society,  London, Sage,  1999.  Moreover,  as Pierre Bourdieu has pointed out,
categorisation  as  praxis  is  a  struggle  “for  the  monopoly  over  ways  of  seeing  and
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understanding,  of  installing  cognition  and  recognition,  of  imposing  the  legitimate
definition of the divisions in society, and hence of making and unmaking social groups”
(“L’identité et la representation”, Actes de la recherche en sciences sociaux, 35, 1980,
pp.  63-72).  In  my  forthcoming  article,  “Migrant  workers  in  the  Pearl  River  Delta:
Discourse and Narratives about Work as Sites of Struggle” (Vanessa Fong and Rachel
Murphy [eds.],  Critical  Asian  Studies,  2007,  special  edition  on  Media,  Struggle,  and
Identity in China), I focus on the links between the representation of migrant workers
in the Pearl River Delta and the experiences of the workers themselves.
45 On the social crisis, see the dossier compiled by Jean-Philippe Béja, “La crise sociale en
Chine”, Paris,  La Documentation française, Problèmes politiques et sociaux, No. 612,
1989, pp. 1-59.
46 See the summary of  the ideological  debates related to the reforms in the 1980s by
Joseph Fewsmith, The Dilemmas of Reform in China: Political Conflict and Ideological
Debate, Armonk, New York and London, M. E. Sharpe, 1992.
47 Ibid., pp. 124-198.
48 Jean-Philippe Béja, op. cit., p. 2, and pp. 36-7.
49 Judith Banister, op. cit., pp. 72-97.
50 Chen Baoliang, Zhongguo liumangshi, Beijing, Beijing shehui kexue chubanshe, 1993,
pp. 2-7, quoted in English in Michael Dutton, Streetlife China, Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 1998, pp. 63-64. See also Zhang Li, op, cit., pp. 33-34.
51 Cheng  Tiejun,  Dialectics  of  Control:  The  Household  Registration  (hukou)  System  in
Contemporary China,  PhD.  Dissertation,  New York,  State University of  New York at
Binghampton, 1991, pp. 70-71, and p. 76.
52 Renmin  ribao,  “Zhongyan  renmin  zhengfu  zhengwuyuan  guan  quanzhi  nongmin
mangmu liuru chengshi de zhishi”, April 17th 1953, p. 1.
53 See the following issues of Renmin ribao, April 17th 1953, p. 1; April 18th 1953, p. 1;
March 15th 1954, p. 2; May 6th 1954, p. 2; March 13th 1955, p. 6; April 10th 1955, p. 6;
and September 3rd 1955, p. 2. 
54 Renmin ribao, April 20th 1953, p. 1. See also Renmin ribao, “Zhongyang neiwubu he
zhongyang laodongbu guanyu jixu guanche ‘quanzhi nongmin mangmu liuru chengshi’
de zhishi”, March 15th 1954, p. 2;  Renmin ribao, “Nongmin mangmu liuru chengshi
yanzhong yingxiang chungeng shengchan”, April 25th 1953, p. 2.
55 Renmin ribao, “Jixu quanzhi nongmin mangmu liuru chenshi”, December 17th 1953, p.
2.
56 Renmin ribao, “Zhizhi nongcun renkou mangmu wailiu” December 19th 1957, p. 1. It
should  be  stressed  that  throughout  the  period  1952-1957,  the  urban  population
increased significantly. See Cheng Tiejun, op. cit., pp. 84-119; Cheng Tiejun and Mark
Sedden,  “The  Origins  and  Consequences  of China’s  Hukou  System”,  The  China
Quarterly, no. 139, 1994, pp. 644-668.
57 “Regulations  concerning  the  registration  of  households  in  the  People’s  Republic  of
China” January 9th 1958, quoted in Cheng Tiejun, op. cit., pp. 403-405.
58 Owing to the famine following the Great Leap Forward, and the difficulties in supplying
the towns, this directive only came into force in 1960.
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cit., pp. 84-102.
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pp. 8-12. See also Renmin ribao, March 10th 1989, p. 2, for a similar set of arguments. 
62 Nongmin ribao, “Chengxiang chabie he nongcun shehui wenti”, November 28th 1988, p.
2.
63 Yang Guangwu, “Mangliu: zai Beijing qiusheng de ling yi qun”, Minzhu yu fazhi, No. 2,
91, 1987, pp. 40-1.
64 Dong Jie, Cai Zhiqiang, and Guan Wenhao, op. cit., pp. 60-2.
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water; figuratively it means to get something illegally.
66 Ba Liang and Ma Lun, “Taozhinzhe de meng” in Wang Lingxu, op. cit., p. 180.
67 See Liang Yibo,  “Nu’er  guo shilu”,  Shehui,  March 1992,  pp.  14-16.  There have been
numerous works on Chinese women migrants  in  different  economic sectors.  See in
particular Delia Davin “Migration, Women, and Gender Issues in Contemporary China”
in Thomas Scharping (ed.), Floating Population and Migration in China: The Impact of
Economic  Reforms,  Hamburg,  Mitteilung  des  Instituts  für  Asienkunde,  1997,  pp.
297-315;  Arianne  M.  Gaetano  and  Tamara  Jacka  (eds.),  Women  in  Rural-to-Urban
Migration in Contemporary China, New York, Columbia University Press, 2004. On the
issues of migration and work in the coastal regions, see Lee Ching Kwan, Gender and
the  South  China  Miracle:  Two  Worlds  of  Factory  Women,  Berkeley,  University  of
California Press, 1998; Pun Ngai, Made in China: Women Factory Workers in a Global
Workplace,  Durham,  London,  and  Hong  Kong,  Duke  University  Press,  Hong  Kong
University  Press,  2005;  and Xu Feng,  Women Migrant Workers  in China’s  Economic
Reform, New York, St. Martin’s Press, 2000.
68 In  the  1980s  and  the  early  1990s,  the  poorest  regions  were  less  concerned  by  the
migrations than the more economically advanced ones. See Hein Mallee, “In Defence of
Migration: Recent Chinese Studies on Rural Population Mobility”, China Information,
Vol. X, No. 3/4 (Winter 1995/ Spring 1996), Leiden, 1996, p. 126.
69 Ibid., pp. 126-129.
70 The  way  in  which  human  mobility  is  explained  has  a  big  influence  on  how  it  is
perceived.  For  a  detailed  study  of  the  theories  of  migration  as  applied  to  China,
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RÉSUMÉS
This article focuses on the ways in which migrants from the countryside were represented in the
late  1980s  and early  1990s,  at  a  time when migration was becoming a  major  topic  of  public
debate.  Basing  his  argument  on  a  close  study  of  daily  and  weekly  press  articles,  scientific
journals, and reportage literature published between 1986 and 1991, he shows how a struggle has
developed over the way the migratory movements are represented, and how it is articulated
around an unresolved duality, namely the state and the market economy. The central issue in
this  controversy  is  the  legitimacy of  the  migrants’  presence  in  the  towns,  and this  involves
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redefining the social and geographical hierarchy. The author also shows in historical terms how
certain  categories  and labels  like  “blind migrant”  have  come into  being;  they  participate  in
developing areas of state intervention (1).
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